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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
The District Court Erred Because The Verdict Was Not Contrary To The Law Or
Evidence
A.

Introduction
A new trial may be granted if the jury verdict was contrary to the law or the

evidence.

I.C. § 19-2406(6).

The state's contention on appeal is that the

evidence showed that Lemmons represented she was delivering an ounce of
methamphetamine; the law provides that the amount of the delivery for trafficking
purposes is the amount represented; and that an ounce is greater than 28 grams
is established scientific fact.

Thus, that the district court did not take judicial

notice that an ounce is 28.35 grams and did not so inform the jury was not an
error requiring a new trial, and the jury's verdict of guilt for trafficking in 28 grams
or more of methamphetamine was not contrary to the law or the evidence, and a
new trial was not required in the interests of justice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-7.)
Lemmons responds by contending that "the conversion of an ounce into
grams is not well known or universally accepted," the state's evidence was that
an ounce is "about 28 grams," and therefore "the jury must have considered
information that was not properly presented at trial, i.e., pursuant to the Idaho
Rules of Evidence." (Respondent's brief, pp. 12-14.) At a later portion of the
brief, Lemmons asserts that the jury must have relied on the prosecutor's
(unobjected-to) argument that an ounce is more than 28 grams. (Respondent's
brief, pp. 18-23.)

Thus, Lemmons appears to be arguing that a new trial is

warranted because of either jury or prosecutorial misconduct.

She does not

assert that the theory for a new trial articulated by the district court is correct.

1

Lemmons' alternative bases for affirming the district court's order granting
her a new trial are without merit. First, there is no evidence whatsoever that the
jury committed misconduct by considering evidence other than that admitted at
trial. Second, neither the record nor the law support the claim that prosecutorial
misconduct was a proper basis for granting a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673,674,931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997);
State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 819, 54 P.3d 460, 462 (Ct. App. 2002). ''The
trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a
reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a
new trial is manifestly contrary to the interest of justice." State v. Davis, 127
Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995).

C.

There Is No Evidence Of Juror Misconduct
A new trial may be granted for the jury misconduct of considering

evidence not received in court. I.C. § 19-2406(2). To demonstrate entitlement to
a new trial defendant must both "present clear and convincing evidence that juror
misconduct has occurred" and demonstrate to the court that "the misconduct
reasonably could have prejudiced the defendant." State v. Seiber, 117 Idaho
637, 640, 791 P.2d 18, 21 (Ct. App. 1989). In this case there is no evidence that
any juror received or considered any evidence outside of court. Lemmons has

2

failed to support this claim with evidence, and therefore it is not an alternative
ground for affirming the trial court's order granting a new trial.

D.

Lemmons' Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Without Merit
Although not entirely clear, Lemmons' brief on appeal could be construed

as asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct as an alternative ground for
affirming the district court.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 18-23.)

However,

"prosecutorial misconduct" is "not among the grounds for a new trial delineated in
I.C. § 19-2406" and therefore such an allegation presents "no basis for a new
trial." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 15, 909 P.2d 624, 633 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.3d 67, 70 (1995), for proposition that
"trial court may not grant a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406 for prosecutorial
misconduct"). To the extent Lemmons claims this is an alternative ground for
affirming the order granting a new trial, such is erroneous.
Even if considered an appellate claim of trial error, 1 Lemmons' claim of
fundamental error fails. "Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at

Lemmons' assertions regarding prosecutorial misconduct may not be
considered as an independent issue on appeal because no claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is asserted in her statement of the issues.
(Respondent/Cross-Appellant's brief on Appeal, p. 5 (asserting as issues error in
failing to grant acquittal on two counts of delivery and error in the jury
instructions).) "Under the Idaho Appellate Rules, an appellant's failure to include
in his initial appellate brief a fair statement of an issue presented for review
results in waiver of the issue." CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154
Idaho 379, 382-83, 299 P.3d 186, 189-90 (2013) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Thus, although the argument may be considered as an
alternative ground raised by the respondent for affirming the district court's order
for a new trial, Lemmons has not raised this issue in her capacity as a crossappellant. In short, it may not be considered as a request for affirmative
appellate relief.
1
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trial, Idaho appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant
demonstrates that the violation in question qualifies as fundamental error." State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "Such review includes
a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persua[sion]."

kl

The first prong requires the defendant show that the alleged error "violates

one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights."

kl

Second, the

defendant must show the error "plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision)."
must show the error was "not harmless."

kl

Third, the defendant

kl

Lemmons has failed to show any prong of the fundamental error test. In
fact, she fails to even mention the three-prong fundamental error test in relation
to her assertion of improper argument.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 18-23.) She

has not claimed, and has therefore failed to establish, any of these three prongs.
During the trial Detective Sweesy testified there were "[a]pproximately 28"
grams in an ounce. (Trial Tr., p. 342, Ls. 3-4.) The prosecutor stated, in closing
argument: "You also heard the testimony of Jerad Sweesy who said that an
ounce is more than 28 grams." (Trial Tr., p. 411, Ls. 6-7.) This single statement
cannot be interpreted as a direct quote, so it was merely a statement of the
inference the prosecutor wished the jury to draw. Given that it is inarguable that
an ounce equals 28.35 grams, the argument that "more than 28" is a reasonable
interpretation of "approximately 28" does not rise to the level of violating due

4

process. Lemmons has failed to show that the argument was improper, much
less that it rose to the level of a constitutional violation.
In addition, defense counsel did not object to this argument, but in his own
argument responded:
[The prosecutor] in his opening statement [sic] says that Mr.
Sweesy declared under oath that an ounce is more than 28 grams?
Where did that come from, ladies and gentlemen? That is not my
recollection of Mr. Sweesy's testimony. As I recall it, and I have
little doubt as to my recollection, but take it for what you will, he
said it's approximately 28 grams. He didn't say more than the 28
grams. The only evidence before you as to what an ounce actually
is is approximately 28 grams. Approximately, not more than. I
urge you to rely upon your own recollection of his testimony, but
that's certainly mine.
(Trial Tr., p. 429, Ls. 2-13.) That defense counsel chose to directly address the
argument rather than object to it is strong evidence of a tactical decision.
Lemmons has not claimed, much less demonstrated, that the error was plain and
the objection not waived by tactical choice.
Finally, contrary to her argument on appeal, it is Lemmons that bears the
burden of showing prejudice arising from fundamental error. Given the extensive
discussion of that line of testimony, and the court's instruction that the jury is to
make their own independent assessment of the evidence (which does not
include arguments of counsel) (Trial Tr., p. 395, Ls. 6-22), there is no reason to
believe the jury accepted the prosecutor's statement as evidence.
The district court erred when it concluded that lack of specific evidence or
judicial notice that an ounce equals 28.35 grams required a new trial in this case.
Lemmons has failed to establish alternative grounds for affirming the trial court.

5

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
The state rephrases the issues on cross-appeal as:
1.
Is Lemmons' claim that double jeopardy bars appellate review of postverdict determinations of the sufficiency of the evidence without merit?
2.
Has Lemmons failed to show error in the lack of a specific instruction on
judging the credibility of informants?

6

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
I.
Lemmons' Double Jeopardy Claim That A Post-Verdict Determination Of The
Sufficiency Of The Evidence Is Not Reviewable Is Without Merit
A.

Introduction
Lemmons contends that whether the district court was correct is

"irrelevant" because she was "entitled to an acquittal when the District Court
ruled that the State's evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction."
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-11.)

Lemmons also argues the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction, entitling her to an acquittal. (Respondent's
brief, pp. 11-14.) Lemmons' first argument fails because the state's requested
remedy-reinstatement of the jury verdicts-does not implicate double jeopardy.
Her second argument fails because Lemmons waived her protections against
double jeopardy by requesting a new trial based on trial error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional

protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).

C.

Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar The Reinstatement Of The Jury's Guilty
Verdicts
Double jeopardy bars post-acquittal proceedings on guilt, but "does not

preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of guilty." Smith v.
Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (citing United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975), and Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145
7

(1986)); see also State v. Carmouche, 155 Idaho 831, _ , 317 P.3d 728, 733
(Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Smith).

Notwithstanding Lemmons' claim to the

contrary, 2 which relies on authority involving mid-trial acquittal by a court3 and not
a post-verdict finding, because the state is requesting this Court to vacate the
district court's post-verdict order and reinstate the jury's verdict, double jeopardy
is not implicated in this case.

D.

Lemmons Waived Double Jeopardy Protections Insofar As She
Requested The District Court To Vacate The Jury Verdict And Give Her A
New Trial
"It has long been settled ... that the Double Jeopardy Clause's general

prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government
from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside,
through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the
proceedings leading to conviction." Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988).
However, a determination that "the evidence is insufficient to prove a defendant's
factual guilt," including "an appellate reversal of a conviction for insufficiency of
the evidence" will (with the exception noted above where a guilty verdict is
subsequently reinstated) bar a retrial.

Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S.Ct. 2044,

2054 (2012). Thus, if the jury's verdict is unsupported by evidence sufficient to

Lemmons also relies on Idaho statutory double jeopardy protection.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 15, 23.) She has failed to articulate how the statute
provides broader rights than constitutional double jeopardy protections. Because
the statute bars "another indictment," I.C. § 19-1719, it is not even relevant to
this case.
2

Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1073 (2013) (cited at Respondent's brief,
pp. 7-10), addressed a directed verdict entered at the conclusion of the
prosecution's evidence and prior to any jury verdict.
3
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sustain Lemmons' factual guilt, she is entitled to an acquittal. Otherwise, she is
not. Review of the evidence shows that it is sufficient to prove Lemmons' factual
guilt, and therefore she is not entitled to an acquittal.
To prove the delivery charges the state had to prove Lemmons knowingly
delivered methamphetamine.

(~, Trial Tr., p. 397, Ls. 3-10.)

There is no

doubt that the jury verdicts finding her guilty of these charges (R., pp. 810-11)
are supported by sufficient evidence. At a minimum she is guilty of delivery.
Lemmons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's
finding that Lemmons represented that the amount of methamphetamine
delivered was 28 grams or more, which elevated the delivery to trafficking. The
evidence was that she did, in fact, represent that the amount was an ounce.
(Trial Tr., p. 240, Ls. 8-16; p. 248, Ls. 12-17.) Because an ounce is greater than
28 grams, the evidence establishes Lemmons' guilt.
Lemmons contends "the State had to prove that there was 28.35 grams in
an ounce." (Respondent's brief, p. 12.) She admits that the state could have
proved this fact through judicial notice. (Respondent's brief, pp. 12-14.) Her first
premise, which she supports with no legal authority, is false: how many grams in
an ounce is not an element of the crime of trafficking. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A).
Lemmons' argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a matter other
than an element of the crime is not a viable claim she is entitled to be acquitted.
Her second premise inherently admits that the jury was not required to determine
the number of grams in an ounce. Rather, she admits the trial court could have

9

taken notice of the English-metric conversion and simply instructed the jury on it.
Again, there is no insufficiency of the evidence.
At a minimum, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury verdicts for
delivery.

Moreover, the evidence that Lemmons specifically represented the

weight of the methamphetamine she delivered each time as an ounce is
sufficient evidence of the trafficking amount of 28 grams or more. It is the state's
position that a new trial, identical except for an instruction that an ounce equals
28.35 grams, is not warranted. An acquittal where the evidence established that
the defendant represented the amount to be greater than 28 grams, merely
because the jury was not specifically instructed on the English-metric conversion
rate, is also not warranted.

11.
Lemmons Has Failed To Show She Was Entitled To A Specific Instruction On
Judging The Credibility Of Informants
A.

Introduction
At trial Lemmons requested a special instruction on determining the

credibility of confidential informant testimony. (R., p. 788-89; Trial Tr., p. 383, L.
22 - p. 388, L. 4.) The district court determined that it would not vary from the
Idaho pattern instructions regarding assessing the credibility of witnesses and
that the instruction might be perceived as commentary on the evidence, and
declined to give the proposed instruction. (Trial Tr., p. 388, L. 5 - p. 390, L. 13.)
Lemmons contends that by denying her requested instruction the district court

10

violated her right to due process. (Respondent's brief, pp. 15-18. 4) Lemmons
has not argued, and therefore has not shown, that the district court's conclusion
that the instructions it gave adequately provided the applicable law on evaluating
credibility was in error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011 ); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002).

"An

erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582,
600-01 (2010)).

C.

The District Court's Rejection Of The Requested Instruction Was
Consistent With Idaho Law
A proposed instruction may be rejected if it is "(1) an erroneous statement

of the law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) not supported by
the facts of the case." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710-11, 215 P.3d 414,
430-31 (2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Molen,

Lemmons' brief also mentions the Supremacy Clause, arguing that "federal
legislation enacted pursuant to constitutionally derived federal authority trumps a
conflicting state law" (Respondent's brief, p. 16), but articulates no basis for
believing that the Clause should be extended from statutes to jury instructions in
state criminal trials.
4
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148 Idaho 950, 957, 231 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Ct. App. 2010). It has long been the
law in Idaho that a court need not instruct the jury to "examine a paid informant's
testimony with greater caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses." State
v. Spurr, 115 Idaho 898,900, 771 P.2d 916,918 (Ct. App. 1989). The court left
open the possibility of using such an instruction "where the informant's testimony
is the sole or primary evidence against the accused, or where the informant's
testimony is uncorroborated," but did not face that circumstance in that case,
where the informant's testimony was "almost entirely corroborated by tape
recordings" and "further corroborated by physical evidence and by the testimony
of law enforcement officers who monitored the transactions."
P.2d 918-19.

kl at 900-01,

771

Under the circumstances of this case, where the informant's

testimony was corroborated by recordings, physical evidence, and the testimony
of monitoring law enforcement officers, the district court's ruling was entirely
consistent with Idaho law.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reinstate the jury's guilty
verdicts and remand this case for sentencing proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of April, 201t

,

~

~\J~,

KENNETH K. JORG~N~E
Deputy Attorney General
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